



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/756
26 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF
MALTA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Malta to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to report on measures instituted by Malta to implement Security Council resolution 917 (1994), adopted on 6 May 1994.

The Government of Malta has brought to the attention of all ministries and parliamentary secretaries the provisions of resolution 917 (1994) with a view to its effective implementation. In this regard, reports received from ministries and departments confirmed that the measures contemplated in this and the other relevant resolutions are being fully implemented.

Legal Notices Nos. 42, 44, 45, 52 and 72 of 1992 already covered the Security Council sanctions set out in paragraphs 2 to 11 of resolution 917 (1994) and other relevant resolutions. Furthermore, the Malta Maritime Authority has, through the Merchant Shipping Directorate, issued a notice (MSD notice No. 8) directed to all Maltese registered ships, ordering the implementation of the sanctions as described and warning of action which will be taken if any Maltese-registered ship violates them. The Ports Directorate has taken measures not to allow any transshipment of goods originating from Haiti or directed to Haiti. Instructions have also been issued to Air Traffic Control restricting movements of aircraft between Malta and Haiti.



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NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF JAMAICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations presents her compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to Note SCA/13/94 (1) of 10 May 1994, has the honour to inform him that in 1991, in response to the economic sanctions imposed by the Organization of American States against Haiti, the Government of Jamaica issued an order* prohibiting all trade with Haiti. This Order remains in force and by this measure the Government of Jamaica has implemented Security Council resolution 917 (1994).

* A copy of the order may be consulted in room S-3545.



Security Council

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26 June 1994
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ORIGINAL: SPANISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 14 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Dominican Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him that the Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, headed by Dr. Joaquín Balaguer, has taken all appropriate measures to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994.



Security Council

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GENERAL

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26 June 1994

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 20 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, imposing trade and economic sanctions on Haiti, has the honour to communicate that the Governmental Commission on Sanctions of the Republic of Bulgaria has been duly informed of the above resolution.

Upon instructions by Mr. Eugeni Matinchev, Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Governmental Commission on Sanctions, the relevant Bulgarian ministries and authorities have been officially informed of the provisions of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) and have been instructed regarding its strict implementation.



Security Council

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GENERAL

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24 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FIFTH PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN LIBERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to Security Council resolution 911 (1994) of 21 April 1994, by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for a period of six months, until 22 October 1994. The Security Council took this decision on the understanding that it would, by 18 May 1994, review the situation in Liberia, including the role played by UNOMIL in that country, based on a report on whether or not the Council of State of the Liberian National Transitional Government had been fully installed, and on whether there had been substantial progress in disarmament and in implementing the peace process. Accordingly, on 18 May 1994, I submitted to the Security Council a report (S/1994/588) describing progress on these aspects of the peace process.

2. On 23 May 1994, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/1994/25), expressing the Council's satisfaction with the full installation of the Council of State and with indications that the Liberian National Transitional Government had begun to assume its responsibilities and functions throughout the country. At the same time, however, the President expressed the Council's concern that political differences and renewed violence among and within certain factions had stalled the disarmament process. The Council reaffirmed its intention to review the situation in Liberia on or before 30 June 1994, including the role played by UNOMIL, progress with respect to the effective operation of the Liberian National Transitional Government, disarmament and demobilization, as well as preparations for the holding of elections on 7 September 1994. The Council also requested me to prepare options by 30 June regarding the future implementation of UNOMIL's mandate and its continued operations.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

3. Following its seating on 7 March 1994, in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement (S/26272, annex), the Council of State began the task of swearing Cabinet Ministers into office. To date, all Cabinet Ministers have been sworn into office and the Cabinet held its first meeting on 13 May 1994. As regards

positions of Deputy Ministers, those allocated to the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL) have been filled. The internal conflict within the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) has, however, held up the assignment of the Deputy Ministerial posts set aside for that party.

4. The Council of State has met on a regular basis. Quite recently, both the Council and the Transitional Legislative Assembly have embarked upon a series of visits to Gbarnga, Tubmanburg and Buchanan to carry messages of peace and reconciliation to the leaders of the warring factions. In this way, attempts are being made to extend civil authority and give a lead to the national reconciliation process. Furthermore, consideration is being given to the appointment of local government officials, to the reactivation of economic activities and to the restructuring of State-owned enterprises. The Liberian National Transitional Government is, for example, having discussions with officials of the Firestone Company with a view to reopening their plantation and thereby creating jobs. This would be a major incentive to disarmament.

5. However, the issue of appointing heads of the autonomous agencies and public corporations remains unresolved. NPFL and ULIMO consider that it is their prerogative to nominate candidates to head these institutions. Such appointments have, in the past, been made by the executive branch of the Government, i.e., the Council of State. The Cotonou Agreement, however, did not specify the body now responsible for them. NPFL and ULIMO have advanced the argument that if the Government is to include the participation of all the parties, the parties should be responsible for the allocation of these posts. A compromise is being sought which, while acknowledging the legitimate role of the Council in this regard, will also facilitate full consultations with the parties. If not resolved, this issue could further delay the peace process.

6. Beyond the difficulties the Liberian National Transitional Government is experiencing in the filling of the vacant posts, the continuing fighting within and between parties constitutes the most serious obstacle standing in the way of the peace process. As I pointed out in my previous report (S/1994/588), prior to the installation of the Council of State, a dispute arose within the leadership of ULIMO, along ethnic lines, between Chairman Alhaji Kromah (Mandingo) and General Roosevelt Johnson (Krahn) over ULIMO nominees to the Council of State. This dispute resulted in an outbreak of fighting in the western region among the ULIMO forces and the displacement of some 36,000 people since February 1994. Mediation efforts involving Chairman Valentine Strasser, Head of State of Sierra Leone, UNOMIL, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Liberian organizations specializing in conflict resolution, elders of both ethnic groups and other prominent Liberians resulted, on 6 May, in a cease-fire and an agreement for further negotiations. Regrettably, the negotiations collapsed and serious fighting resumed on 26 May in Tubmanburg.

7. The central issue in the ULIMO negotiations is the question of how to meet the Krahn's desire for representation in the Transitional Government. The Council of State has indicated its readiness to facilitate this and has encouraged consultation among the ULIMO groups. In the search for a solution to the ULIMO conflict, the Special Representative has cautioned the leaders of

both groups that the disintegration of ULIMO as an organization could disrupt and possibly destroy the peace process.

8. In the eastern part of Liberia, attacks by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), an armed group formed after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, against the NPFL constitute another major impediment to the peace process. LPC, comprising essentially Krahn combatants, has attacked and occupied several areas previously controlled by NPFL. This conflict has been directly responsible for the displacement, since February 1994, of an estimated 50,000 persons to Buchanan. In addition, NPFL remains unwilling to disarm as long as LPC continues its offensive. The Liberian National Transitional Government, UNOMIL and ECOMOG continue to pursue mediation efforts to bring about a cease-fire between the two parties that, if successful, would lead to disengagement of forces and formal involvement of LPC in the disarmament and demobilization process.

9. The parties' mistrust for one another has, in the case of some parties, extended to ECOMOG. In this context, ECOMOG's role as a peace-keeper has become increasingly complex in the performance of its security role.

10. Soldiers of the Nigerian and Ugandan contingents have recently been abducted and held for varying lengths of time by Mandingo elements of ULIMO and LPC, both of which have claimed that ECOMOG has become involved in the conflict. Two soldiers are yet to be released by ULIMO and UNOMIL continues its efforts to obtain their release. Furthermore, ECOMOG has been accused, primarily by NPFL, of arbitrariness and inflexibility in its surveillance of Liberians who travel to and from NPFL territory, especially on the Gbarnga-Monrovia axis. The Liberian National Transitional Government is consulting with ECOMOG on how it might best assume a greater share of responsibility for the country's internal security, as civil authority is extended.

11. NPFL has also asserted complicity between some elements of ECOMOG and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in supplying material and logistical support to LPC. In view of the potential implications of these assertions for the peace process, my Special Representative has discussed the issue with the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Field Commander of ECOMOG. He has advised me that ECOMOG is treating the assertions with seriousness and that the Field Commander has undertaken an investigation of the matter. Meanwhile, the Chairman of ECOWAS and the Field Commander reaffirm that it is not the policy of ECOWAS or ECOMOG to support any faction in the Liberian conflict. There is no doubt, however, that the level of mistrust between NPFL and ECOMOG has been heightened as a result of these claims.

12. However, ECOMOG's role in the four-year civil conflict in Liberia has been widely acknowledged as an innovation in regional peace-keeping. The addition of troops from the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda has added a highly-valued Organization of African Unity (OAU) dimension to the operation. The efforts of ECOMOG, though questioned by some factions, have been greatly appreciated by most Liberians, as well as the international community, which recognizes the human and financial sacrifice made by the West African Governments.

13. Nevertheless, under the present circumstances of mistrust and hostilities between and within some factions, and despite the efforts of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, the parties have refused to engage actively in the disarmament of their combatants or to give up control of territory. As a result, the Council of State has found it difficult to exert its authority throughout the entire country and this impedes the advancement of the peace process.

14. An additional cause for serious concern is the failure of the international community to provide financial support for those Governments which have contributed to ECOMOG. At the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity at Tunis earlier this month both the President of Nigeria and the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Soglo of Benin, drew my attention to the financial burden that the troop-contributing countries, particularly Nigeria, were carrying as a result of their contribution to ECOMOG. Nigeria specifically said that it would have to withdraw its contingents unless a solution could be found to the problem. I urged them that troops should not be withdrawn precipitately and undertook to endeavour to obtain additional financial support from Member States which are in a position to provide it. I am actively pursuing this matter and will report to the Security Council as necessary.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

15. In accordance with its concept of operations, UNOMIL had planned to deploy 39 military observer teams in three phases, by March 1994. By mid-June, however, owing to the security situation in various areas of the country, only 29 teams had been deployed in their respective locations (see attached map). Since December 1993, there have been 12 incidents in which United Nations military observers have been harassed, their possessions taken and/or United Nations vehicles and radios confiscated. ULIMO has been responsible for six, LPC for one, and NPFL for five of these incidents. Only in three cases have the items been recovered.

16. In the western region, insecurity in upper Lofa county impeded the deployment of military observers. Aerial reconnaissance in this region was carried out in May and deployment will be undertaken subject to improvement of the security situation and to the deployment of ECOMOG forces. Problems resulting from fighting within ULIMO necessitated the temporary withdrawal in May 1994 of the Kongo Border Crossing Team in Grand Cape Mount county to Monrovia. This team will be redeployed to that area once UNOMIL has received the necessary assurances regarding its security.

17. Full deployment has been completed in the central and northern regions. In the eastern region, only four out of nine teams have been deployed. Efforts are being made to obtain the concurrence of NPFL in undertaking reconnaissance missions in the areas near Tobli and Zwedru, which are a necessary preparation for any further deployment in the area.

18. Over the past three months, ECOMOG has deployed its troops further west and north. In the western region, ECOMOG deployed in the towns and villages of Kle, Robertsport, Tubmanburg, Tiene, Bo and Kongo. In the northern region, deployment has only been effected in Gbarnga. ECOMOG's plan to deploy

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throughout the country has not yet materialized. Mutual mistrust between NPFL and some elements of ECOMOG, stemming from the period when ECOMOG undertook peace enforcement measures and from the assertions referred to above, has greatly inhibited further ECOMOG deployment in the northern and eastern regions.

IV. DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

19. According to the information provided by the parties, it is estimated that a total number of approximately 54,000 adult and 6,000 child combatants will have to be demobilized. Three months after the start of demobilization, a total of 3,192 combatants have been demobilized (ULIMO, 739; NPFL, 731; AFL, 685). During this period, 1,951 weapons, 166,079 rounds of assorted ammunition and 19 pieces of plastic explosives were surrendered by the warring parties.

20. Four demobilization camps are operational. Only an average of 10 combatants a day are currently being disarmed. Before NPFL declared that it would stop the disarmament of its combatants, 1,500 NPFL combatants had been congregated in one assembly area ready to disarm. These combatants are still in the area and are receiving food rations from UNOMIL. As noted earlier, mistrust, lack of commitment and, in some instances, open hostility between and among the various parties and other armed groups have been and continue to be the principal reasons for the slow pace of disarmament.

21. Three rehabilitation centres for child combatants have been opened and 180 child fighters have been disarmed and demobilized. Of those, 130 have been successfully reunited with their families and 50 remain in the centres for longer care. Twelve children attempted to leave the programme prematurely but returned after a short period. Psychological support is given to the children by a team of social workers under the supervision of a psychologist. Substance abuse, particularly marijuana, is evident among the children. This programme, run by a local non-governmental organization, is financed through voluntary contributions.

22. Recognizing that employment is a major incentive for ex-combatants to return to normal life, the World Food Programme (WFP) has initiated a food-for-work programme involving 1,200 ex-combatants in a National Volunteer Scheme of labour-intensive tasks. Such tasks include urban sanitation, agricultural and other activities in Monrovia and Konola. Resources permitting, this approach will be replicated around the country.

V. ELECTORAL PROCESS

23. The Security Council will recall that in my last report (S/1994/588), I indicated my intention to send a team of international experts to Liberia in order to consult with the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Elections Commission. The team visited Liberia from 26 May to 4 June 1994 and met with members of the Council of State, the Cabinet and the Legislative Assembly. The team also participated in three public forums, including one held in Monrovia with 200 officials of more than 20 political parties, and two held in Gbarnga and Harper.

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24. The team's discussions centred on the timetable for the forthcoming presidential and general elections and the operational and other constraints to be overcome if elections are to be held on the scheduled date of 7 September 1994. Such constraints include, *inter alia*, voter registration, identification of candidates, constituency boundaries, and resource requirements. There was widespread agreement among the Liberians with whom the team consulted that substantial progress in disarming combatants was an absolute prerequisite for the holding of free and fair elections. One political party, however, while reiterating its commitment to disarmament, observed that it was also of critical importance that elections be held on the scheduled date.

25. Officials of the Transitional Government and the political parties have requested more information on the system of proportional representation, which, under the prevailing circumstances, would facilitate the organization of the elections. The political parties have requested my Special Representative to convene a series of meetings with the Elections Commission, the UNOMIL Electoral Observer and the United Nations Development Programme Electoral Adviser to review preparations and assist in establishing ground rules for the elections. Eventually, the choice of the electoral system in Liberia will be made by the Liberian authorities.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

26. Reports on food distribution indicate that of a possible 1,500,000 people in need, approximately 1,100,000 are receiving humanitarian assistance at this time. An estimated 400,000 people are inaccessible in sections of the south-east, Lofa and, most recently, Cape Mount and Bomi counties. Of the total number of beneficiaries, 800,000 are registered as displaced, of whom 150,000 were displaced within the last six months. This brings the monthly requirement of food for distribution to 12,000 metric tons. For 1994, 70 per cent of the estimated food needs have been mobilized by the international relief community, including the United Nations agencies and organizations and non-governmental organizations.

27. Owing to intra-factional conflict within ULIMO, 20,000 people fled to Monrovia in February and March. Since fighting broke out on 26 May, 16,000 people have been displaced in Tubmanburg, taking refuge at the UNOMIL and ECOMOG bases and the hospital. These people are in need of food, medical care, shelter and water. Humanitarian convoys accompanied by heavy ECOMOG escorts are reaching them with supplies. ECOMOG confirms its ability to provide adequate security and the population has displayed its confidence in this by massing around the ECOMOG base.

28. Fighting in the south-east continues to be disruptive. Civilians displaced from that area, totalling 50,000, have been arriving in Buchanan since February. Reports have been received indicating that 2,000 civilians are trapped in the Liberia Agricultural Compound where LPC has restricted their movement.

29. On 17 May, an inter-agency assessment took place in Greenville, Sinoe county, facilitated by an ECOMOG vessel. Food was also delivered to civilians who were found to be malnourished. The hospital was depleted of supplies. A

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second mission in mid-June replenished the hospital and delivered 105 metric tons of food.

30. An increase in malnutrition has been noted in some accessible parts of the country, such as in Nimba and parts of Bong county. In Nimba, an international non-governmental organization has reported that the severe malnutrition rate increased from 4.3 to 6.7 per cent between February and May 1994. Among the factors related to the increase in malnutrition were the arrival of some 20,000 repatriating refugees and newly displaced persons from the south-east and Upper Lofa county, as well as deteriorating road conditions during the rainy season. Bridge repairs are being carried out along the main distribution routes to ease the delivery problems, and emergency food distributions to the displaced population have also been accelerated in the past month.

31. A positive impact of returnees, especially in Nimba County, is the reopening of 106 schools with a registration of 16,000 students. This is because of the return of many teachers and school-feeding programmes supported by the World Food Programme and the non-governmental organizations.

32. Satisfactory improvement in nutritional status continues to be seen in other parts of the country, especially in Montserrado, Margibi and Buchanan, where coordination among the relief agencies has improved.

33. In the past two months, 1,800 metric tons of seed rice have been distributed in five counties, including Maryland in the south-east. In addition, 40,000 farmers have benefited from tool distribution. It is anticipated that by the end of June, 40 per cent of the seed needs will have been met throughout the country.

34. Organized voluntary repatriation of the 700,000 Liberian refugees has been equally affected by the slow pace in the peace process. However, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continues to facilitate the spontaneous repatriation of refugees. An average of 1,000 persons have been returning every month from Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone to areas in Nimba and Bong counties as well as to Monrovia and its environs. Depending on the success of the spontaneous returnee programme and on advances in the peace process, UNHCR is considering launching a pilot project for organized repatriation to areas which are safe and accessible. This will be accompanied by fund-raising for rehabilitating basic social infrastructure in areas of return to improve the absorptive capacity of those communities. Assistance to Sierra Leonean refugees in Upper Lofa has not resumed because of insecurity in the area. UNHCR is looking into the possibility of mounting a cross-border operation to Upper Lofa from Guinea, if security permits.

VII. PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

35. The civil conflict in Liberia has been characterized by major abuses of human rights. All factions share the blame. The use of 6,000 children in combat is a flagrant example of disregard for the rights of the child. The Lutheran Church massacre in 1990, which claimed the life of 600 innocent civilians, and the Harbel massacre of June 1992, where another 600 innocents

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were slaughtered in a five-hour period, are but extreme examples of atrocities which have been committed throughout the country.

36. Disregard for human life continues in some quarters. My Special Representative has visited Buchanan, where he has spoken to displaced civilians who report abuses such as branding with scalding machetes and other methods of torture which they firmly attribute to LPC.

37. Women, who have throughout the conflict been victims of mental and physical abuse, continue to suffer. In Buchanan, the non-governmental organization Assistance to Women and Girls (AWAG) is providing counselling to 90 women, all of whom, since February, have been raped by combatants. The youngest victim receiving care is 12 years old.

38. The widespread allegations of human rights violations have not as yet been transformed into verifiable data by either international human rights groups or by the four main Liberian voluntary human rights organizations, namely, the Centre for Law and Human Rights Education, the Justice and Peace Commission, the Liberian Human Rights Chapter and the Liberia Watch for Human Rights. These institutions are currently the repositories of hundreds of preliminary reports of violations in all parts of the country. However, the institutions have so far been unable systematically to verify reports of abuses because of continuing insecurity and other technical and logistical difficulties.

39. My Special Representative has been holding discussions on these and related issues with the Liberian human rights organizations. In pursuance of Security Council resolution 866 (1993) of 22 September 1993, which mandated UNOMIL to report to me any major violations of international humanitarian law, a joint plan of action has been developed. The principal objective of this plan is to increase public awareness of human rights and their relationship to the reconciliation process. It is hoped that these collective efforts will enhance the Liberian capacity to investigate and verify incidents of abuse; develop a technical capacity for storage and retrieval of relevant data and information; set minimum standards for reporting and monitoring; and stimulate greater public understanding of individual and community responsibility for the reporting of abuses, which may ultimately become a deterrent against perpetrators.

40. In this respect, consideration is also being given to the establishment of a national committee on human rights that would involve the appropriate agencies of the Transitional Government, the Liberian Bar Association and the four human rights organizations mentioned above. Agreement has already been reached by representatives of these organizations on a draft questionnaire to be used for the collection of data. Work is also proceeding on defining the elements for standardized approaches for checking, verification and subsequent investigation of these reports. A public information programme is being developed aiming to increase awareness of the contribution that social justice, fairness and equity can make to improved governance.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

41. The continuing hostilities of recent months have led to new population displacements and have placed additional demands on relief organizations in Liberia. In addition to the political imperative of complete disarmament and demobilization in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement, I would appeal, on humanitarian grounds, to all armed factions in Liberia to cease their hostilities and extend full cooperation to organizations engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I commend the efforts of the United Nations agencies and NGOs in responding to those in need in Liberia, often under dangerous and difficult conditions. I would also encourage donors to continue to respond positively to the requests addressed to them for assistance in meeting the urgent needs of newly displaced persons.

42. There are pockets of security in Liberia where the Liberian National Transitional Government is attempting to extend its civil authority and I encourage the Transitional Government to continue its efforts to this end. Emergency humanitarian assistance will be required in Liberia well into the future but as conditions improve in several counties Liberians will be able to redirect their efforts to self-sustaining and productive endeavours.

43. The present insecurity and restricted commercial activities constrain Liberian efforts to energize the reconciliation process, to speed up recovery and to establish a sustainable basis for improved governance and greater public participation. The impact of the economic sanctions currently placed on certain areas of Liberia has also contributed to the sluggishness of the economy. My Special Representative has advised me that the Liberian National Transitional Government is addressing these issues on several fronts and that it is planning to discuss with ECOWAS the issue of economic sanctions. It has also set out policy considerations in important economic and human development areas by proposing a linkage between the reintegration of ex-combatants and economic development and the restructuring of public sector management. The Government's concerns about these issues are to be presented at an informal consultation of donors in Abidjan scheduled to take place during the week of 20 June 1994. These initiatives are important steps forward in the reconciliation process and they represent a necessary focus on the immediate and medium-term requirements of recovery. I encourage donors to support the Liberian National Transitional Government in this direction.

44. The deployment of the ECOMOG forces and the UNOMIL observers in all parts of Liberia will be critical in generating confidence among Liberians throughout the country. In this regard, the Cotonou Agreement recognized the neutrality and authority of ECOMOG in supervising its implementation. I remain satisfied by the collaboration between UNOMIL and ECOMOG at senior levels. It is necessary to remind the international community that ECOMOG continues to require its financial support in order to fulfil its responsibilities in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement, and I call on the international community to contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund set up for this purpose. I am also pleased to learn that ECOMOG is investigating alleged reports of misconduct by some of its soldiers, as the effective disarmament and demobilization of the warring factions require the continued confidence of all Liberians in ECOMOG.

45. In his statement of 23 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/25), the President of the Security Council conveyed the Council's request to me to prepare options by 30 June 1994 regarding the future implementation of UNOMIL's mandate and its continued operations. As I have consistently stated in previous reports, I believe that the basis for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace and stability in Liberia is the faithful implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. I continue to believe that UNOMIL's mandate is relevant to the circumstances in Liberia and that the Mission's efforts are critical to the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and to assisting the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Liberian people to achieve national reconciliation.

46. With the full installation of the Transitional Government and its various administrative instruments, significant progress has been made in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The Transitional Government is a most important building block for the future. At the same time, however, it is my view that the various Liberian interests, and in particular, the leaders of the warring factions, have not yet addressed national reconciliation with the necessary resolve, compassion and commitment. Their lack of resolve has led to increased suffering, especially among the displaced population. UNOMIL can only assist the Liberian National Transitional Government and the Liberian parties to bring peace to their country; the main responsibility is with the Liberian National Transitional Government and the parties.

47. Bearing this in mind, it is imperative that all the Liberian parties extend a greater cooperation to ECOMOG and UNOMIL in order to move the peace process forward and achieve the objectives outlined in the Cotonou Agreement, including the holding of national elections. The delays which have been experienced in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement cannot be allowed to continue. The Security Council may accordingly wish to consider the possibility of laying down specific monthly targets which must be met by the Liberian parties, particularly with respect to disarmament and demobilization of combatants. My Special Representative will be ready to advise the Liberian parties on how targets set by the Security Council can be met.

48. The emergence of two new factions in Liberia after the signing of the Cotonou Agreement, and the split within ULIMO, have substantially added to the difficulties of implementing the Agreement. I call upon the Liberian National Transitional Government to exercise the responsibility of bringing together all the parties in Liberia with a view to agreeing and carrying out measures aimed at addressing the problems raised by the new factions (the Liberian Peace Council and the Lofa Defence Force) and the split within ULIMO.


49. The Liberian National Transitional Government must also take drastic measures to advance the peace process and pave the way for elections in accordance with the Cotonou Agreement. Liberians must quickly decide on the electoral system that will be most feasible in their present circumstances, bearing in mind that an estimated 40 per cent of the voting population is displaced. Taking all these factors into consideration, it is essential that the Liberian National Transitional Government, with the cooperation of ECOWAS and the assistance of UNOMIL, bring all the Liberian parties together to agree on specific steps that must be taken to ensure that the elections are held on

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schedule. Time is now very short. Unless the Liberian National Transitional Government, the Elections Commission and the Liberian parties take drastic measures now, there is a serious danger that they will not be able to hold the elections on schedule.

50. I should point out that there is a limit to the extent to which the United Nations and the international community can continue to accept delays by the Liberian parties in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, which they voluntarily signed. Delays by the Liberian parties in advancing the peace process necessarily compound the financial difficulties experienced by the ECOMOG troop-contributing countries in maintaining their contingents in Liberia. Should the peace process experience further undue delays, some ECOMOG troop-contributing countries may be compelled to withdraw their contingents from the force, thus jeopardizing the successful implementation of the peace process. Obviously, without the necessary support and cooperation of ECOMOG, UNOMIL would not be able to carry out successfully the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. Should the Liberian parties fail to maintain their commitment to the peace process, I will have no alternative but to recommend to the Security Council that the involvement of the United Nations in Liberia be reconsidered.

51. Finally, I urge the Liberian factions to set a date for the complete cessation of hostilities, which is necessary for disarmament and preparations for elections to begin, and to live up to this date. I will report on progress made in this regard, including the continuation of UNOMIL's mandate in my next report to the Security Council. The warring factions, which have been responsible for so much death, suffering and destruction, must realize that it is they who are delaying a new dawn of hope for the Liberian people. It is they who must show the necessary political will and flexibility in finding solutions to the present impasse. It is important to realize that in the absence of tangible progress in disarmament, it will be increasingly difficult to sustain the commitment of the troop-contributing countries and the international community to supporting the peace process in Liberia.





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27 June 1994

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LETTER DATED 27 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen concerning the situation in Yemen.

I would appreciate it if the enclosed statement can be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla S. AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Republic of Yemen

26 June 1994

An authoritative source has stated the following:

Since 6 p.m. on Saturday, 25 June 1994, our armed forces, the forces of unity and legitimacy, have been implementing fully the declaration of the National Defence Council concerning the consolidation of the cease-fire, under the supervision of French and United States military attachés in the Republic of Yemen and of other members of the Joint Military Commission, thus complying with United Nations Security Council resolution 924 (1994) and responding to the appeal for a cease-fire made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in keeping with the spirit of the efforts and disinterested initiatives undertaken by our brothers and friends with a view to giving the insurgents a further opportunity to put an end to the hostilities, to abandon their insurrectionary goals, to settle the Yemeni problem through peaceful dialogue within the framework of the Republic of Yemen, to preserve the unity of the country and to respect its constitutional legitimacy.

However, the insurgents and outlaws have as usual rejected the above-mentioned initiative, turning a deaf ear to the appeal made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and refusing to respond favourably to the efforts undertaken by our brothers and friends with a view to consolidating the cease-fire agreement. Very early on Sunday morning, these insurrectionary elements resumed their acts of aggression against our troops, which they shelled. Moreover, they carried out air raids on areas inhabited by innocent civilians and on some of our military positions situated on the axes of Aden and the Hadhramaut.

The same authoritative sources added the following:

We reaffirm that our armed forces continue to comply with the cease-fire agreement, and we wish at the same time to stress that it is solely the insurrectionary outlaws who have rejected the initiative described above and for the sixth consecutive time thwarted efforts to consolidate the cease-fire agreement, completely ignoring the appeals made and the efforts and steps undertaken to that end.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/762
27 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF YEMEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement from the National Defence Council of the Republic of Yemen concerning the situation in Yemen.

I would appreciate it if the enclosed statement can be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdalla S. AL-ASHTAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Republic of Yemen

Yesterday, Saturday, 25 June 1994, the National Defence Council issued a communiqué concerning the cease-fire in which it reaffirmed that the Republic of Yemen was complying with Security Council resolution 924 (1994) and supported all efforts and all disinterested initiatives to consolidate the cease-fire.

The insurgent forces, which are operating outside the law, have not respected the cease-fire and have violated and flouted it with a view to internationalizing the conflict.

Since the communiqué was issued the following violations have been recorded:

1. From 8 a.m. to 9.15 a.m. on 26 June 1994, aircraft of the renegade and secessionist forces attacked our troops stationed in the Al-Abr and Bi'r Asaker regions;
 2. At 9 a.m. on the same day, the forces of the band of renegades and secessionists bombarded one of our units stationed at the City of the People in Aden, setting one of our tanks on fire;
 3. At 9.27 a.m. on the same day, aircraft of the renegade forces bombed one of our units stationed in the vicinity of Aden.
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/763
27 June 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 27 JUNE 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

I am pleased to transmit to you herewith a letter from His Royal Highness, Prince Saud Al-Faisal Al Saud, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia. I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gaafar M. ALLAGANI
Ambassador

Annex

Letter dated 13 June 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Saudi Arabia addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Government of my country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, I should like to transmit to you the following reply to the letter dated 6 June 1994 addressed to you by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Yemen, in which he expressed his Government's strong sense of regret at the contents of the opening address to the fifty-first session of the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council on Saturday, 4 June 1994:

I should like to inform you that the contents of the above-mentioned opening address and the press statement issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council are a sincere expression of the profound regret and acute grief felt by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the fraternal States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council at the ferocious fighting, bloody conflict, overwhelming losses of lives and property and destruction of the potentials and capacities of Yemen, which must necessarily rend the heart of every sincere person, particularly since the fighting is between brothers.

The expression of the keen desire of the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council for the restoration of security and stability in Yemen accords fully with the provisions of Security Council resolution 924 (1994) calling for an immediate halt to all military operations and engagement in peaceful dialogue, with a view to ending the bloodshed and preserving lives and property. Inasmuch as the international community has, through this resolution, affirmed the need for the maintenance of peace and security in Yemen, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the compounded concern of the States of the Gulf Cooperation Council is not only in accord with the principles of the United Nations Charter but also and primarily with the centuries-old bonds based on one creed, one language, kinship and shared interests that link Saudi Arabia, the other States of the Council and the fraternal people of Yemen. Since the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council expressed their alarm at the continuation of the fratricidal fighting, lest it render this situation explosive and threaten peace and security in the region, this alarm did not emanate from a vacuum but from real events taking place in Yemen. The Government of Saudi Arabia reaffirms its invariable policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any State and respect for good-neighbourliness. It reaffirms also the statement concerning Yemeni unity in the press statement issued by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council at its fifty-first session. It cannot, in the circumstances, understand the motives for the protest by the Government of Yemen against the contents of the opening address and the press statement issued at the above-mentioned session. It does not, therefore, approve the course of stirring up inflammatory feelings in order that the fratricidal fighting may continue.

My country's Government expresses extreme surprise at the contents of the last paragraph of the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yemen, in which he asserts that "these provocative and unwarranted attitudes and statements, which represent an encroachment on the unity of the Republic of

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Yemen and give encouragement ... to rebellion against law and order, will not perhaps be helpful in ensuring implementation of the aforesaid Security Council resolution".

At the same time, we wonder where is the alleged provocation? What I stated earlier accords fully with what was stated by the Security Council in resolution 924 (1994), which calls for an immediate halt to all military operations and engagement in peaceful dialogue, in order to end the bloodshed and preserve lives and property. This reflects the position of the Government of Saudi Arabia, which accords with international legitimacy as expressed in Security Council resolution 924 (1994).

Accordingly, my country's Government rejects this protest and sincerely hopes that the Yemeni command in Sana'a will respond positively to the provisions of Security Council resolution 924 (1994), that it will not resort to military force for the settlement of disputes among brothers, and that the appeal of the Arab community, as endorsed by international legitimacy, will be heeded in all sincerity.

(Signed) Saud AL-FAISAL
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Saudi Arabia



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/764
27 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN YEMEN

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 924 (1994) of 1 June 1994.
2. The resolution, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to the area as soon as possible to assess prospects for a renewed dialogue among all those concerned and for further efforts by them to resolve their differences. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the situation at an appropriate time, but not later than one week after the completion of the fact-finding mission.
3. On 3 June 1994, I informed the President of the Security Council that I had decided to appoint Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi as my Special Envoy and Head of the fact-finding mission to Yemen (S/1994/664). On the same day, the President of the Security Council informed me that the members welcomed my decision (S/1994/665).
4. Mr. Brahimi started his mission on 7 June 1994 at Geneva where I met with him for a briefing session. He was accompanied by a political officer from the Department of Political Affairs and a staff member from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. From 8 to 19 June 1994, the Special Envoy visited Sana'a (twice) and Mukalla. He also travelled to Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt.
5. In all his meetings during the visit to the region, Mr. Brahimi expressed the concern of the international community over the deterioration of the situation in Yemen. He reviewed the elements of Security Council resolution 924 (1994), which set up the mandate of the mission, and expressed the wish to listen to the views of all the parties concerned.

II. VIEWS OF THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

6. At every opportunity throughout his visit to Yemen, the Special Envoy emphasized the paramount necessity of agreeing on an immediate cease-fire, as called for in Security Council resolution 924 (1994). Only when a cease-fire became effective would it be possible to expect the resumption of dialogue.

7. At Sana'a, official discussions took place with President Ali Abdallah Saleh and a number of Cabinet ministers led by Dr. Mohammad Said Al-Attar, the Acting Prime Minister.

8. The Acting Prime Minister indicated that despite his country's reservation that the Security Council had discussed the internal situation of his country and that this might set a grave precedent in the history of the United Nations, he nevertheless welcomed the adoption by the Council of resolution 924 (1994) on the situation in the Republic of Yemen. He believed that the resolution had affirmed legitimacy within the framework of the Republic of Yemen and linked the cease-fire with a number of steps that Yemen regarded as an integral part of the resolution.

9. Regarding the cease-fire, the Yemeni side stated that the military option had been imposed on the legitimate authorities by the separatists. A three-day cease-fire was declared on 21 May 1994, even before the Security Council adopted resolution 924 (1994), in the hope that the cease-fire would be a step towards the definitive suspension of hostilities and the beginning of political dialogue. Suddenly, however, the separatists made their declaration of secession within hours of the announcement of the cease-fire.

10. The Yemeni side further stated that it required guarantees from the Security Council that the cease-fire would not be exploited by the separatists and their supporters to consolidate the illegitimate separatist State and strengthen themselves with funds and weapons or to allow them to engage in political manoeuvres with a view to securing the recognition of certain States, which the Republic of Yemen would regard as a violation of the Security Council resolution. The Yemeni side also stated that the adoption of a resolution to dispatch observers would be completely unacceptable.

11. Regarding the resumption of dialogue, the Yemeni side expressed its conviction that dialogue was the best way of resolving differences. The other side was not in earnest in engaging in dialogue and was exploiting it for purposes of manoeuvre. The Yemeni side was nevertheless prepared to engage in dialogue in accordance with the following principles:

- (a) Respect for constitutional legitimacy;
- (b) Rescinding of the decision on secession;
- (c) Commitment to the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen;
- (d) Compliance with the results of the elections of 27 April 1993;
- (e) Incorporation of those combatants under the command of the rebels that remain into the legitimate armed forces, with the same rights and duties as their counterparts;
- (f) Surrender of all weapons and military equipment in the possession of the rebels to the legitimate armed forces;

(g) That the dialogue should begin immediately and be completed within five days;

(h) That the dialogue should be conducted in Sana'a with no third party in attendance;

(i) That there should be no participation by the 16 persons against whom indictments have been issued by the Public Prosecutor.

12. The Yemeni side stated that it welcomed the statement made by the Secretary-General concerning the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Yemen and to victims of the war, stressing that the Government of the Republic of Yemen had taken the initiative in this matter and had submitted a request for assistance to the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme at Sana'a and that a number of meetings had taken place in that regard. The Government therefore welcomed any assistance in this domain provided by the United Nations and its organs or by friendly States to the Government of the Republic of Yemen.

13. As agreed with the Government, the Special Envoy also held discussions with a group of political leaders representing 24 political parties, as well as with a group of members of Parliament representing all political parties, led by their Speaker, Sheikh Abdallah Al-Ahmar. Both groups stressed the need to preserve unity at all cost. They agreed, however, that it was necessary and urgent to reach a cease-fire and to restart dialogue, provided it was within the existing constitutional framework.

14. The mission visited Mukalla on 12 and 13 June 1994, where Southern leaders expressed their views on the situation. The Southern leaders presented an analysis of their perspective of the evolution of the situation since the unification of Yemen in May 1990. They explained that soon after unity was achieved in 1990, influential people in the leadership of the former northern part of the country who were opposed to unity, development and modernization, launched an undeclared war on the leaders of the Yemen Socialist Party. After the parliamentary elections of 27 April 1993, the situation became further confused, violence continued unchecked and political and economic life was brought to a halt. They added that more recently, since 27 April 1994, Yemen had been involved in a serious war between the forces of the two former States, which were not integrated with each other after the unification of the country. This was also the case with many other institutions.

15. They expressed deep gratitude to the Security Council and the Secretary-General for their interest in the situation in Yemen and for the adoption of Security Council resolution 924 (1994), and reaffirmed their commitment to the provisions of all six of its operative paragraphs.

16. The Southern leaders attached the highest priority to the observance of a cease-fire. In this connection, they welcomed the declaration of readiness made by Sana'a, as communicated to the Security Council through the Special Envoy, and its proposal that a military observer team should supervise the cease-fire. Since the former Military Commission established shortly before the outbreak of the war included the military attaché of the United States of America, the

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military attaché of the Russian Federation and the military attaché of France, representing the European Union, in addition to representatives of the Sultanate of Oman and Jordan and northern and southern military elements, it was necessary, on that basis, to make speedy arrangements to organize the monitoring of the cease-fire by an integrated team capable of managing the task and carrying it out in the best possible manner. The observation team should also include representatives of Africa, Asia and the League of Arab States. Subsequently, consultations can be held on the necessary arrangements for dialogue to begin between the parties concerned without preconditions or reservations

17. They stressed the importance of giving urgent attention to the humanitarian aspect.

18. The Southern leaders suggested the convening of an emergency meeting of the Security Council to adopt deterrent measures against the Sana'a regime.

19. While at Mukalla, the Special Envoy met with a group of political leaders representing 22 political parties and various organizations who expressed their support for Mr. Ali S. Al-Bidh and for the proclamation of the new State made on 22 May 1994. Some expressed the hope that international recognition would be granted to that State. All demanded that the cease-fire be observed and monitored by international observers so that dialogue could begin between the two sides.

III. VIEWS OF THE NEIGHBOURING STATES

20. The Special Envoy also held talks with government leaders in Egypt, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The neighbouring States were unanimous in reiterating to the Special Envoy the expression of their deep concern over the current state of affairs in Yemen. They all expressed profound sorrow at the tragic loss of life, the suffering of the people and the destruction of infrastructure and private and public property caused by the war. All stressed that they had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of their neighbours. They also made it clear that this was a serious threat to peace and security in the region and that, consequently, the continuation of the fighting was not acceptable. All leaders were in agreement that political differences could not be resolved by force and that it was up to the people of Yemen, and to them alone, to decide how they should organize their political future.

21. Leaders from Jordan and Qatar were of the view that the preservation of unity, in a form on which the Yemenis would agree, would best serve the interests of Yemen, as well as preserve peace and security in the region. In the other neighbouring States, all leaders reminded the Special Envoy that when unity was achieved between the two Yemeni States, it had been unanimously welcomed and supported by all countries in the region. They reaffirmed their position that it was up to the Yemeni people and their leaders, who were parties to the conflict, to decide for themselves, through peaceful dialogue, whether they would live in a unified State or return to the situation which existed prior to 22 May 1990, when there were two independent States, both of which were

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members of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

22. All Governments in the region expressed the hope that the two parties would speedily comply with the provisions of Security Council resolution 924 (1994) and cooperate with the United Nations to attain an immediate cessation of hostilities under adequate control and to resume dialogue.

IV. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

23. The Special Envoy and the members of the fact-finding mission paid particular attention to the effect of the hostilities on the civilian population. Immediately after their arrival, they met with the representatives of all the specialized agencies, as well as with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Special Envoy also raised the issue during his discussions at Sana'a and Mukalla.

24. At Sana'a, a member of the mission from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Serge Tell, held extensive discussions with representatives of governmental departments, foreign embassies, and international and non-governmental organizations that were directly concerned. He travelled to Taiz and Lahej governorates as part of the Inter-Agency Assessment Mission that took place from 13 to 15 June 1994. To complete his information, he was to go to Aden to assess humanitarian needs and to discuss the overall situation with leaders in the South. However, he could not do so because of the security situation in Aden.

25. The report of the Inter-Agency Assessment Mission is therefore incomplete at this stage. However, it includes a section on the situation in Aden based on information obtained from United Nations staff members who were evacuated from the city on 17 June. These reports were supplemented by information received from several international relief organizations. The most important conclusion of the mission is that a major crisis is imminent unless a political solution is found or at least a cease-fire is put into force as soon as possible.

V. ATTEMPTS TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE

26. As indicated earlier, the Special Envoy stressed everywhere the necessity of reaching an immediate cease-fire. Yet, despite the acceptance by both sides of resolution 924 (1994) and six announcements that a cease-fire would come into force, fighting has continued. Indeed, it has intensified around Aden, and, according to some reports, it has spread to areas that had not been affected up to 15 June 1994.

27. After receiving the Special Envoy on 9 June 1994, President Ali Abdallah Saleh announced in Sana'a that a cease-fire would become effective as of 1200 hours local time. However, within hours, fighting erupted again, with each side accusing the other of restarting it.

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28. President Ali Abdallah Saleh proposed reviving a Joint Military Commission, which would include Yemeni officers from the two warring parties, as well as officers from Jordan and Oman and the military attachés of France and the United States. However, subsequently, the President proposed that the revived Commission should work without its non-Yemeni members, which would make arrangements to enforce the cease-fire an internal, inter-Yemeni affair.

29. The other side rejected this proposition outright. In a memorandum submitted to the Special Envoy at Mukalla on 12 June 1994, they made a counter-proposal to the effect that a Joint Commission should be formed with all the members of the former one, plus other representatives from Africa, Asia and the League of Arab States.

30. President Ali Abdallah Saleh conveyed to the Special Envoy that the proposal made by the other side was not acceptable, but he said he would be willing to accept the participation of the non-Yemeni members of the old Commission. He would even accept the addition of two more countries: Syria and a country from the Maghreb - Algeria or Morocco, for example.

31. While the distance between the two parties was still considerable, there appeared to be enough common ground to try to work out a compromise that would ensure that a cease-fire would enter into force and that a mechanism would be established to stabilize the situation. After intensive consultations and a second visit to Sana'a, it was agreed that the two sides would send emissaries to meet the Special Envoy at Cairo and possibly to meet face to face to discuss a cease-fire and the mechanism to supervise it.

32. The Special Envoy received the two sides successively on 19 June 1994. The Government in Sana'a had earlier suggested that the meeting should be between the three political parties that had been members of the Coalition Government since the general elections in 1993. Although it was made abundantly clear to them that this suggestion was not acceptable to the other side, they nevertheless sent to Cairo a delegation composed of the two political parties that were still in the Government of Sana'a: the General People's Congress and the Yemen Reform Grouping. Consequently, there was no face-to-face meeting between the two sides.

33. It proved equally impossible to agree on a mechanism to supervise the cease-fire, as the delegation from Sana'a insisted that any arrangement had to be made within a purely intra-Yemeni national context.

34. On 24 June 1994, the Secretary-General received, successively, Mr. Abdel-Karim Al-Iryani and Mr. Haydar Al-Attas. He again expressed his concern that the cease-fire called for in resolution 924 (1994) was not being observed and that the fighting around Aden had, in fact, intensified. He very strongly urged an end to the fighting and the creation of a mechanism to supervise the cease-fire as a prelude to the resumption of dialogue.

35. On 25 June 1994, Sana'a announced that a cease-fire would enter into force as of midnight that same day. Mr. Al-Attas published a communiqué indicating that his side would stop firing if the other side would do the same. It was also agreed that on the following day, 26 June, provided the cease-fire held,

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the Special Envoy would resume discussions with the two sides, represented by Mr. Ali Al-Iryani and Mr. Al-Attas, to seek agreement on the mechanism to supervise the cease-fire. Unfortunately, once again the cease-fire did not hold for more than a few hours.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

36. It is a matter of serious concern that almost four weeks after the adoption of resolution 924 (1994), fighting has not stopped in Yemen and that repeated commitments to the cease-fire have not been honoured.

37. It is particularly worrisome that the inhabitants of the city of Aden continue to be subjected to so much suffering. Indeed, fighting has intensified in the course of the last few days and the number of casualties has risen dramatically. There is no electricity most of the time in most parts of the city and the shortage of water is serious. Hospitals lack both equipment and medical supplies to cope with the situation. The International Committee of the Red Cross and international aid organizations find it more and more difficult to carry on with their admirable work.

38. Very little is known about fighting elsewhere in this vast territory. But this is a real war, with all the dire consequences of war everywhere: human casualties, suffering of innocent people and destruction of infrastructure and public and private property.

39. Understandably, neighbouring countries are following developments in Yemen with growing concern. Past history and recent experience illustrate that a crisis such as the one in Yemen tends to affect security and stability in the whole region. It is therefore in the interest of all concerned that the conflict be contained and resolved as quickly as possible.

40. There is general consensus that:

(a) A cease-fire is necessary and urgent;

(b) A mechanism to supervise the cease-fire is also necessary and should be organized. Indeed, both sides have already agreed on some aspects of this mechanism, namely, that it should be a joint commission, that it should include a number of officers from both sides and that representatives from Jordan and Oman as well as the military attachés of France and the United States in Sana'a would take part. However, there are still differences between the two sides concerning representation from other countries;

(c) Once the cease-fire is effective, dialogue should restart with the help of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, at a venue to be agreed upon.

41. My Special Envoy was well received by the two parties, which have repeatedly expressed support for his mission. I am grateful to them, and I earnestly call upon them to translate this goodwill into active cooperation with Mr. Brahimi.

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42. I should also like to take this opportunity to express to the leaders of all neighbouring countries my deep appreciation for their cooperation with me and my Special Envoy. Their cooperation will be invaluable for the continuation of our efforts in connection with this crisis.

43. The call made in resolution 924 (1994) concerning the delivery of arms to the warring parties needs to be stressed. Enough harm has been done by the ample stocks already available to them, and surely better use can be made of the resources Yemen possesses or has access to.

44. The most urgent task ahead is to put an end to the fighting and to start providing urgent aid to the people who so badly need it, particularly, but not only, in the city of Aden.

45. The Security Council may wish, at this stage, to make abundantly clear that the present state of affairs cannot be tolerated, that the cease-fire must now enter into force without delay and that the two parties must be urgently requested to cooperate with my Special Envoy in the establishment, within the next few days, of the mechanism to supervise the cease-fire. Should the parties so desire, I would be prepared to recommend to the Council the deployment of United Nations military observers, once a cease-fire is in place. These United Nations observers could be supplementary to whatever supervisory mechanism might be agreed upon between the parties. The Council may also request the two parties to start immediately thereafter a dialogue which my Special Envoy could organize in consultation with them at a mutually agreed neutral venue, possibly Geneva.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1994/765
28 June 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
MISSION IN HAITI

1. In my report of 18 March 1994 (S/1994/311), I noted that the Security Council might wish to consider authorizing the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in its current form for a period of three months, to allow for the possibility of reactivating the mission with a minimum of delay, should the political impasse be overcome and implementation of the Governors Island Agreement resumed.
2. By its resolution 905 (1994) of 22 March 1994, the Security Council extended UNMIH's mandate until 30 June 1994 and requested me to report to the Council at such time when conditions existed in Haiti for the deployment of UNMIH for purposes consistent with paragraph 5 of the Governors Island Agreement (see S/26063) and, taking into account circumstances at the time of the report, to make specific recommendations on the composition of UNMIH and the scope of its activities within the overall personnel levels established in Security Council resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993.
3. In the light of the failure of the Haitian military authorities to fulfil their obligations under the Governors Island Agreement and to comply with relevant Security Council resolutions, the Security Council adopted resolution 917 (1994) on 6 May 1994 imposing additional sanctions against Haiti. The Council noted that the military authorities in Haiti continued to impede the deployment of UNMIH and decided that measures adopted in resolution 917 (1994) and earlier relevant resolutions would not be completely lifted, among other conditions, until the creation by those authorities of the proper environment for the deployment of UNMIH, the retirement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, the resignation or departure from Haiti of the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Armed Forces and of the Chief of the Metropolitan Zone of Port-au-Prince.
4. In the statement of conclusions adopted at their meeting in New York on 3 June 1994 (S/1994/686, annex), the Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti expressed their determination to promote the full deployment of UNMIH when conditions permitted and envisaged the reconfiguration and strengthening of the mission. They invited the Secretariat to take appropriate measures to prepare for the quick return of UNMIH to Haiti.

5. The Ad Hoc Meeting on Haiti of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States (OAS), held during the twenty-fourth session of the OAS General Assembly at Belém, Brazil, unanimously adopted on 9 June 1994 a resolution (MRE/RES.6/94) which called on all member States to support measures by the United Nations to strengthen UNMIH in order for it to assist in the restoration of democracy through the professionalization of the Armed Forces and the training of a new police force, to help maintain essential civil order and protect the personnel of international and other organizations involved in human rights and humanitarian efforts in Haiti.

6. The further deterioration of the situation in Haiti has substantially changed the circumstances under which the present UNMIH was planned. In the light of the recommendations adopted by the OAS Foreign Ministers as well as the conclusions drawn by the Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti at their meeting on 3 June, and bearing in mind changing realities on the ground, the Council may wish to consider modifying the original mandate established for UNMIH. In that case, it would be necessary to estimate the additional resources which would be required for the mission to accomplish its new tasks.

7. Meanwhile, in view of the continuing determination of the international community to remain actively involved in the efforts to resolve the crisis in Haiti, I recommend that the current mandate of UNMIH be extended for a period of one month. This extension would enable the Friends of the Secretary-General on Haiti and the members of the Security Council respectively to undertake consultations amongst themselves and with the parties concerned on the possible strengthening of UNMIH and its role in the overall attempts of the international community to find a long-overdue solution to this crisis.



**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.
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~~A/49/208~~
S/1994/766
1 July 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 37 (b) of the preliminary list*
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF
ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly and of the Security Council the progress report of the United Nations special mission to Afghanistan, in pursuance of paragraph 4 (a) of General Assembly resolution 48/208 of 21 December 1993, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan".

* A/49/50/Rev.1.

ANNEX

Progress report of the special mission to Afghanistan

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The international community has observed the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and its deleterious effects with mounting concern. On 21 December 1993, the General Assembly adopted resolution 48/208, entitled "Emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy and reconstruction of war-stricken Afghanistan". In paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General "to dispatch to Afghanistan, as soon as possible, a United Nations special mission to canvass a broad spectrum of the leaders of Afghanistan, soliciting their views on how the United Nations can best assist Afghanistan in facilitating national rapprochement and reconstruction, and to submit its findings, conclusions and recommendations to the Secretary-General for appropriate action."

2. On 1 January 1994, fighting intensified in Kabul and several other locations in Afghanistan, provoking further concern about the deteriorating situation in the country, especially the significant civilian casualties, the large number of displaced persons and the failure of the Afghan leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. In this connection, the Secretary-General issued two statements, on 4 and 12 January 1994, respectively, calling for, inter alia, an immediate cessation of the hostilities. His second statement supported the early dispatch of the special mission once conditions permitted and was issued in consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States of America. On 24 January 1994, the Security Council issued its first presidential statement on Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/4) since 12 August 1992. The statement, among other things, reiterated the Secretary-General's call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to dispatch the mission as soon as possible.

3. On 14 February 1994, Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri was appointed by the Secretary-General to head the special mission to Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, he came to New York where he met various Afghan government officials, including two Deputy Foreign Ministers as well as the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations. He also met with representatives of Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia and the United States, as well as other countries. He travelled to Washington where he met the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, as well as other State Department officials dealing with Afghanistan.

4. On 14 March 1994, the Secretary-General made public his intention to dispatch the mission as soon as possible. On 23 March, the Security Council issued a second presidential statement on the situation in Afghanistan (S/PRST/1994/12), which, among other things, expressed its support for the mission and urged all Afghans to assist it in carrying out its mandate and thus

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promote the cessation of hostilities, the resumption of humanitarian aid and the restoration of peace in Afghanistan.

5. The wide support for the special mission in the General Assembly, which unanimously adopted resolution 48/208, is an important indication of the international community's desire to begin a more active effort to help end the conflict in Afghanistan. In addition, the special mission was greatly assisted by the statements of the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

6. On 27 March 1994, the special mission, headed by Mr. Mestiri, began its work in Afghanistan. In addition to Mr. Mestiri, the mission included: Mr. Mousouris, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, as Mr. Mestiri's Deputy; Mr. Francis Okelo, Senior Political Affairs Officer (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan); Mr. Charles Santos, Political Affairs Officer for Afghanistan (Department of Political Affairs); Mr. Juan de Castro, Economic Affairs Officer (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), Mr. John Mills, Spokesman; and Colonel Harry Quirke, Military Adviser (Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan). During its visits to regional and other interested countries, as well as its meetings with Afghan personalities in Europe, the Mission's composition varied.

7. The substantive and logistical support provided by the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the assistance by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations specialized agencies in Afghanistan were indispensable. All members of the mission demonstrated a high degree of competence and provided valuable assistance and advice which was greatly appreciated.

8. From 27 March to 29 April 1994, the special mission travelled in Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Shebergan, Herat, Bamyan, Kandahar and Khost, and in Pakistan to Peshawar and Quetta, where it held meetings with a number of Afghan leaders, personalities and groups. During this period, it also met with Pakistani officials. It then travelled to Teheran, Riyadh, Moscow and Ankara to meet with senior governmental officials. It travelled to Jeddah to meet with officials of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (see appendix).

9. The mission canvassed the views of Afghans through meetings with leaders and groups, private meetings, large gatherings, public addresses, as well as through memoranda, peace plans, letters and notes which it received. It met with a wide spectrum of political leaders, which included, *inter alia*, President Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Governor Haji Qadir and Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari (Hezb-i-Wahdat-e-Afghanistan); General Abdul Rashid Dostum (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan); Governor Ismael Khan (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (Jamiat-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf (Ittehad-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); former President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (Afghanistan National Liberation Front); Maulawi Younis Khalis (Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan); Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani (National Islamic Front for Afghanistan); Commander Jalalludin Haqqani;

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Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan; Governor Gul Agha of Kandahar; Commander Amir Lalay; and Mullah Naqib.

10. The mission also canvassed the views of independent personalities, commanders, religious and tribal leaders, scholars, various Shura members, women's groups, and professional, business and student organizations. The mission also met a number of Afghans living abroad, including the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah.

II. FINDINGS

11. Every place it visited, the special mission was warmly greeted by common Afghans as well as those in authority. In fact, in some places it was greeted by thousands, even tens of thousands of people. There were also many spontaneous demonstrations of support, which were often attended by hundreds and in some cases thousands of people.

12. Throughout its itinerary, the mission was approached by numerous Afghans who expressed their thoughts, feelings, ideas and views on how the current situation might be resolved. It received written proposals from most of its Afghan interlocutors, who ranged from political leaders to common Afghans. Most Afghans the mission met presented eloquent and passionate views, many making specific and detailed proposals about the present conflict. In total, the mission received more than 300 peace proposals, letters and requests. It was greatly impressed by the practical and realistic nature of the many ideas and peace proposals, but what was most striking was the convergence of views.

13. Travelling throughout Afghanistan, the mission found that although some parts were still at war, most of the country, at least two thirds, was at peace. It was impressive, for instance, to observe that no arms were seen in the streets of Herat. The effect of the war, however, could be felt throughout the country, spreading instability to various regions. The fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of people, especially from Kabul, to leave their homes, killed and wounded thousands more and obstructed United Nations reconstruction and humanitarian efforts. Moreover, the fighting has undermined the very national institutions necessary to bring peace and to rebuild the country.

14. Wherever the mission met the Afghan public, the people called for an end to the fighting, bloodshed and destruction and the restoration of peace. The Afghan people also called for the United Nations to help end the conflict and bring peace to their country. The expressions of gratitude, support and encouragement were very moving as the people put aside the uncertainties of their present situation to hope again for a better life.

15. The fighting in Kabul seemed mostly to be characterized by artillery, rocket and mortar fire and some bombing. This type of warfare, while generally posing little risk to the combatants themselves, has caused enormous casualties among innocent civilians who have borne the brunt of the exchanges of fire. Since the recent round of fighting began, little territory has changed hands in Kabul.

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16. The impression one gets is that many of the soldiers fighting for either side are reluctant to risk their lives in this struggle. Most of the combatants appear to be young men and/or adolescents, many of whom may be illiterate. Over and over again, the Mission was told that the majority of those fighting were doing so for the money since this was one of the only ways to earn a living, especially in Kabul. One point that was clearly made by numerous Afghans, including many engaged in the fighting, was that the present conflict was not a jihad, but a struggle for power.

17. In several northern locations, fighting appeared to involve more conventional military tactics, i.e., infantry assaults with the objective of seizing particular positions. But once again, very little has changed. Almost all the Afghans that the mission spoke with said that no military solution was possible. Events of the last two years and in particular of the last six months, have clearly demonstrated the futility of the military option.

18. The conflict has had a significant effect throughout the country, increasing tensions in many areas, which have occasionally erupted in fighting. Nevertheless, most regions have generally avoided being drawn into the present confrontation.

19. The present economic situation of the country is characterized by an economic infrastructure that has been almost completely destroyed. The economy appears to have deteriorated further during the last two years, with real output declining in 1992/93. In Kabul, Kandahar and Herat, as well as other places, whole sections have been destroyed. Heavy and large industries in Kabul and other cities have been looted. Roads, bridges, communications, electricity, water, schools, irrigation systems and power plants are in ruin. The banking system and civil aviation are in collapse. Much destruction occurred during the war against foreign occupation and the Communist regime. Nevertheless, serious damage has also occurred since power was transferred in April 1992.

20. Recent indications are that price increases are accelerating, with the prices of certain food items and fuel having increased 200 to 300 per cent during the last fiscal year. This trend is likely to continue as no steps have been taken to establish fiscal control and monetary restraint. The direct effects of war caused a substantial fall in agricultural production, with the southern and south-eastern regions being most affected. Before the war, irrigated land produced 77 per cent of all wheat and 85 per cent of all food and agricultural crops. An estimated 27 to 36 per cent of all irrigation systems were directly affected by war, which does not take into account the indirect effects of neglect and abandonment.

21. The shortage of energy directly affects the lives of most people living in the urban and semi-urban areas of Afghanistan. The present non-availability of power and fuel hampers practically all essential services of society, such as public administration, health care, irrigation, telecommunications, civil aviation, road transport and industrial production. The entire infrastructure for importation, transportation, distribution and storing of petroleum products no longer exists. Most of the Government tanker fleet has been damaged or seized by military groups, and oil pipelines from the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are no longer operational. Petroleum products are now

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widely imported in small quantities by individuals and private entrepreneurs. However, this type of operation is affected by the security situation and is currently not sufficiently organized to meet the needs of the country.

22. As a result of the destroyed infrastructure, only a few local economies have been able to function in certain regions, and the re-emergence of a national and interregional economy has been prevented. In addition, because of the present conflict, national economic institutions have not been able to manage the economy successfully.

23. The main points of agreement the special mission found are listed below:

(a) All Afghans that the mission met unanimously expressed a profound yearning for peace, condemned the current fighting and demanded that it end immediately. They said the fighting was causing untold death, destruction, injury, dislocation and human suffering and viewed the termination of hostilities as a necessary step to begin a political process;

(b) Every Afghan expressed great pride in the victory against foreign occupation and the toppling of the Communist regime. They also expressed appreciation for the sacrifices of the Mujahideen; however, they stressed that they were greatly disappointed that some of their leaders were engaged in the fighting;

(c) All Afghans demanded that the Government of Afghanistan represent the will of the Afghan people. They demanded that all segments of Afghan society be allowed to participate in an equitable and inclusive political process. They also expressed scepticism at whether the present political arrangements could achieve this;

(d) All the people the special mission met, including all the political leaders, were emphatic that foreign interference was fuelling and prolonging hostilities in Afghanistan and that this had to end in order for reconciliation to proceed. Many Afghans, including most of the leaders, requested that the United Nations help prevent foreign interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan;

(e) Even though Afghanistan is a diverse society with many ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations, the people widely identify themselves, first and foremost, as Afghans and Muslims. All Afghans wanted to ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan;

(f) There was wide support for a transitional period during which a broad-based transitional authority would restore order and security, collect weapons and prepare for some type of assembly or election that would fully reflect the will of the Afghan people;

(g) Most Afghans strongly felt that the international community and the United Nations had deserted Afghanistan for the past two years. They often emphasized that this was probably the last chance to bring peace to their country. They expressed appreciation for the present United Nations approach, which they said had the best chance of bringing peace to the country. In their

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discussions with the mission, the Afghans often implored the United Nations not to abandon or fail them and to be involved at every stage of the political process. In this connection, many Afghans called upon the United Nations to re-establish and maintain its physical presence throughout the country and in particular in Kabul;

(h) Most Afghans opposed a non-Afghan armed military presence, including United Nations peace-keeping troops. They said that they would not accept any armed foreign presence in their country. Nevertheless, almost all supported some form of United Nations monitoring, which could oversee a cease-fire and the collection of heavy weapons and supervise elections;

(i) Most Afghans called for a collection of arms and the demilitarization of the country, with many saying it should begin in Kabul. Some groups suggested that there might be some programme of repurchasing or compensation in exchange for weapons. Many suggested that the United Nations should assist in monitoring the disarmament process;

(j) There was wide consensus that a major international effort to assist in the reconstruction of the country was absolutely essential, with particular emphasis on the physical infrastructure of the country. Assistance was also required to help to re-establish medical and educational services and rebuild public institutions, as well as to help address the problem of narcotics trafficking. Afghans viewed the lack of economic alternatives as one of the causes of the war. Many were disappointed that the international community had not provided more assistance. All Afghans, including the leaders, were in favour of starting reconstruction efforts as soon as possible. They viewed reconstruction as integral to establishing a sustainable peace process;

(k) There appeared to be a wide consensus that some sort of security force should be established, initially for Kabul, which would become the nucleus of a national army;

(l) Afghans felt that an important objective of the peace process should be the formulation and adoption of a new constitution that would embody the national sentiment and identity;

(m) In addition to the United Nations, many Afghans expressed confidence and support for the Organization of the Islamic Conference playing a role in the peace process, including the type of monitoring described above;

(n) There was widespread agreement that refugees should be repatriated, with the aid of the international community, and that their participation in the peace process should be facilitated even before their return;

(o) There were also calls for a United Nations role in monitoring human rights until security and confidence were established.

24. The many proposals received, including those of the political leaders, often went into great detail on the mechanics of establishing an acceptable political process. It was often in the very complex mechanisms that differences of opinion could be noted. But the special mission found many Afghans to be

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flexible about their proposals and willing to entertain modifications or changes in order to make the proposals more acceptable.

25. There were some basic differences which focused on the nature and type of the political process, for example, whether there should be a Shura (a consultative body or council), Loya Jirgha (a traditional grand council or assembly), elections, or some combination thereof. Although almost all Afghans expressed the desire for some form of transitional period in which functional governance would be restored, there was a difference of opinion, especially among the leaders, on the type, number and order of steps necessary to achieve this end. Even though some opposed it, the Loya Jirgha was often mentioned as a forum through which a representative government could be established. Nevertheless, there were differences as to its timing, composition and function, as well as how it would be convened.

26. All the regional and other interested countries that the special mission visited, including Iran, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States, expressed their full support for the United Nations efforts and offered whatever assistance was necessary. Moreover, all countries consulted emphasized that they were interested in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan in which the country's territorial integrity and sovereignty were maintained and where the Afghan people would determine their government, free from outside interference.

27. The special mission held two meetings, at Jeddah and Islamabad respectively, with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference for Afghanistan. The discussions focused on how the United Nations and the Organization of the Islamic Conference could cooperate to bring peace to Afghanistan.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

28. The fact that the vast majority of Afghans appear to believe that the present conflict is a struggle for power should be of serious concern. The latest phase of the conflict, which began on 1 January 1994, has ruptured the remaining vestiges of a functioning central administration in Afghanistan, which were put into place by agreements negotiated at Islamabad and Jalalabad.

29. The mission was struck not only by the universal belief among Afghans that significant and systematic foreign involvement was taking place, but also by the depth of resentment towards those perceived to be fuelling the conflict in Afghanistan. Even though all the mission's regional interlocutors expressed their full support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan, such perceptions should be of concern to the international community.

30. Afghanistan is now one of the world's largest producers of opium as well as other narcotic drugs. Little money apparently goes to those who grow the illicit crops. Most of the money seems to be made elsewhere. It is obvious

that the lack of central authority and the instability in the country have contributed to an increase in production and trafficking of illicit drugs.

31. The conflict in Afghanistan also flourishes because of the chaotic economic situation and the lack of viable economic alternatives. Many outside of Afghanistan have argued that it is necessary to have peace first, then reconstruction. But the mission believes that reconstruction assistance should not be seen as separate from but integral to a lasting political solution. Political and economic activity are interrelated and interconnected forces, which must be linked in Afghanistan in ways which encourage peace. It is important to point out that in areas where such forces have been encouraged, one sees the beginnings of sustainable economic activity, responsible political leadership and effective administration.

32. Although it may not be possible to begin reconstruction efforts at the same time a political process is being initiated, it is essential that reconstruction efforts begin soon thereafter. Until the infrastructure of the country is repaired and public health and education are restored, the prerequisites for a stable financial system will not emerge and the Afghan economy will remain in its shattered state.

33. UNDP, with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat), has implemented some successful but limited reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, which have focused primarily on reconstruction and rehabilitation of irrigation systems, roads, bridges and housing and the production of seeds for agricultural use. These efforts have often been coupled with de-mining operations and have been successful in encouraging economic activity and normalcy in some areas. In these cases, the restart of economic activity has attracted the return of displaced persons as well as refugees. The reconstruction approach of UNDP, which seeks to cooperate with local Shuras (councils) at the district level, has shown great promise in determining and implementing projects for the revitalization of local communities. A number of other agencies and programmes of the United Nations system, including the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), have been implementing a variety of important projects, which, in addition to their humanitarian purpose, are complementary to the efforts for reconstruction.

34. Even though ethnic and tribal tensions exist and have widened over the past two years owing to the current conflict, the widespread notion of Afghanistan as a sovereign and independent State still remains a powerful force. The unity of the Afghan nation, however, is increasingly coming under threat from the present conflict. Not only has it undermined the capacity of the political leaders to provide for the basic needs of the people, but also it has eroded the legitimacy and importance of governmental institutions needed to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of the State itself. If nothing is done to stem the violence and begin a political process in which all segments of Afghan society are represented, including all ethnic, tribal and religious groups, disintegration could increasingly become a serious possibility, with grave regional and international implications.

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35. It is clear to almost everyone in Afghanistan, even to many of those engaged in the fighting, that no military victory by either side is possible. A continuation of the war serves no purpose, except to prevent the emergence of a truly representative political process and the reconstruction of the country. It seems that the Afghan people are losing or have lost confidence in the ability of many of their leaders to resolve their differences peacefully. They have not yet lost faith in their country.

36. At the national level, what is needed is the establishment of an acceptable transitional authority which could oversee a cease-fire, institute a process of disarmament, provide security throughout the country, especially in Kabul, and prepare for some form of elections in one to two years. Before such an authority can be established, there must be a country-wide cessation of hostilities. Any successful political process must involve all segments and groups of Afghan society. Afghans are looking for peace. Many leaders to whom the mission spoke are ready, with the assistance of the United Nations, to work to establish a peace process.

37. The Afghans were adamant that the United Nations should not leave them, imploring the Organization and the international community not fail them. At present, no regional or other country has the support and respect that the United Nations still commands in Afghanistan. The Afghans have seen how the lack of international attention has, in part, fed instability by creating the impression that the world did not care whether there was peace or war in Afghanistan.

38. Clearly, it is time for the United Nations and the international community to assist the Afghans more actively in bringing peace to their country. The international community and the United Nations must stay engaged for peace. A successful comprehensive effort to encourage peace would have to link international reconstruction assistance to a national political dialogue on acceptable transitional arrangements. Such an effort would also have to pursue concerted and coordinated efforts to encourage regional disengagement.

39. The opportunity exists to alter the present stalemated political and military equation with practical diplomatic approaches - not with large peace-keeping forces or some other expansive international effort - and move Afghanistan away from war and towards peace. In any effort, it is important to rely not only on the desire of all Afghans to end the war, but also on Afghan ingenuity and faith in their nation to move the peace process forward. The Afghans saw the United Nations as the last and only way out. There should be no illusions that this will be an easy task. It will require patience, steadfastness and creative political approaches, but it is possible to create a momentum for peace.

40. The first phase of a re-engaged United Nations effort would incorporate the following:

(a) Given the great demand by all Afghans for the United Nations to be in Afghanistan, the Organization should re-establish its physical political presence at Kabul. If this is not possible, Jalalabad could serve as a provisional location, with the political representative making numerous visits

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to Kabul as well as visits to other cities. Other specialized agencies and programmes might also consider moving more fully back into Afghanistan, especially UNDP, in order for the political and reconstruction aspects to be more closely coordinated on the ground in Afghanistan. Governments should also be encouraged to re-establish their presence in Afghanistan;

(b) Given the necessity for greater international action and attention to be focused on the situation in Afghanistan, it is recommended that a working group of countries interested in peace, normalcy and reconstruction in Afghanistan be established which would assist closely United Nations peace efforts and eventually prepare an international conference on Afghanistan;

(c) It is recommended that the United Nations begin serious and in-depth consultations with the various Afghan leaders on the establishment of a viable transitional authority and a complete and total cease-fire;

(d) A country-wide cease-fire and the establishment of a transitional authority are essential if conditions are to be established for free and fair elections. Such elections would be the best way to ensure that all segments of Afghan society participate in determining the future of the country. Furthermore, it may be beneficial to explore the possibility of utilizing indigenous decision-making structures, such as a grand assembly or council, to facilitate the necessary conditions for elections.

APPENDIX

Itinerary of the special mission

1. At Islamabad, the special mission began talks with a view to arranging a cease-fire that would enable it to visit Kabul and meet with representatives of the parties engaged in the hostilities, as well as representatives from other segments of Afghan society. While arrangements for the cease-fire at Kabul were being made, the mission travelled to Jalalabad on 30 March 1994, where it visited and heard the views of the displaced persons who had fled Kabul since the beginning of January. It also met with the Governor of Jalalabad, Haji Qadir, the Shuras of the provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Kunar and about 200 tribal leaders and intellectuals.

2. From 2 to 6 April 1994, the mission held meetings at Kabul with His Excellency Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan; His Excellency Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Prime Minister; Mr. Abdul Ali Mazari, leader of Hezb-i-Wahdat; Professor Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf, leader of the Ittehad-i-Islami; Mr. Abdul Karim Khalili, Minister of Finance, along with the Minister of Commerce and Mr. Murtazavi; Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud; and representatives of the Supreme Coordination Council, including Dr. H. Mojaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front, General Fauzi of Jumbish-i-Milli, a representative of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and Humayun Jarir of Hezb-i-Islami. In addition, the mission met with Commander Jalalludin Haqqani; Mohammad Ali Jawed, Deputy Leader of the Harakat-i-Islami and Minister of Planning; Dr. Najibullah Lafraie, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Arsalan Rahmany, Deputy Prime Minister, along with the Vice President of Harakat (Mohammadi); and the Governor and a Shura of Logar in Mohammad Agha, where an outdoor meeting was held. It also met with the Council of 14 Provinces, led by General Zaher Azimi (Harakat); the Emam Ghazzali Foundation; the Mayor of Kabul, Mr. Fazl Karim Aimagh; and a gathering of the district representatives at the City Hall. It met with the Coordination Council of the Displaced People, other representatives of displaced people, the Lawyers' Association, the Association of Peace Servants, a group of professors from Kabul University, the Afghan Women's Association and other social organizations. In various parts of the city and its surroundings, the mission met with several organized and spontaneous gatherings of large numbers of people who submitted petitions and notes.

3. On 16 and 17 April, the special mission visited Mazar-i-Sharif, where it was greeted by thousands of people. The mission met with General Abdul Rashid Dostum, Chairman of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, and other members of the Movement. It also met with intellectuals, professionals, representatives of a medical doctors' association and women's groups, elders from Mazar-i-Sharif, representatives from the northern provinces and displaced people. It held meetings with a number of political figures, including Mr. Sayed Mansour Naderi, the leader of Ismailis in Afghanistan, and Mr. Tawana Taleghani, and visited the camp of displaced people from Kabul. It then travelled by road to Shibergan, where it attended an outdoor meeting of tens of thousands of people, who enthusiastically voiced their support for the

mission and during which many proposals were submitted. The mission then held private talks with General Dostum.

4. On 18 and 19 April, the mission was in Herat, where it held several meetings with Governor Ismael Khan. It also met with a gathering of governors, commanders and other representatives from 14 Afghan provinces, who presented their peace plan. In addition, the mission met with Dr. Jalil Shams, Deputy Foreign Minister, prominent personalities, women's groups and business leaders. The mission also attended the celebration of the second anniversary parade of the liberation of Herat.

5. On 20 April, the mission arrived in Bamyan, where it was received by a large crowd, and attended a rally where leaders presented their views on the conflict. It also had meetings with the head and members of the Shura of Bamyan, with representatives of displaced families, women's groups and Hazara delegations from Bamyan, Uruzgan and Ghazni. It also met tribal elders, representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat and a delegation from the province of Parwan.

6. On 23 April and again on 25 April, the mission held meetings at Quetta with the Afghan Consul, Haji Abdul Khaliq, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Hamed Karzai, and a large group of commanders from Kandahar. It also met with delegations from the provinces of Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar. In addition, it met with tribal chiefs and elders representing the Popalzai, Noorzai, Barekzai, Alekozai, Ishaqzai, Aleezai, Achekzai, Tokhi, and Mohammadzai tribes and with representatives from Arghistan, Marouf and Spin Boldak. In addition, the mission held meetings with religious leaders, some 300 persons from Quetta and the southeastern provinces, two groups of students, women's groups, and intellectuals.

7. On 24 April, the mission travelled to Kandahar, where thousands of people greeted it at the airport and outside the Governor's residence. Along with the Governor of Kandahar Province, Gul Agha, the mission met two important commanders, Amir Lalay and Mullah Naqib, as well as other elders and commanders from Kandahar and neighboring provinces. It was unable to meet with another commander, Mr. Sarkateb Atta Mohammed.

8. The mission held meetings at Peshawar on two occasions, from 9 to 11 April and on 26 April. During its first visit, it met with the former Afghan President, Mr. Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front; Mr. Maulawi Younis Khalis, leader of the Hezb-i-Islami-e-Afghanistan; and Pir Syed Ahmed Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan. It also met with Maulawi Tarakheel, Deputy Prime Minister Qutbuddin Hilal, Commander Abdul Haq, Minister of Repatriation Farouq Azam, Dr. Taleb and accompanying representatives of the Hezb-i-Wahdat. It also held meetings with delegations from the provinces of Kunar and Paktia and Shinwari tribal leaders. The mission also met with a group of Afghan organizations, including Afghan Mellat party, the Movement for National Unity, the Afghanistan All Mujahids Great United National Islamic Big Jabbah, the Organization for Peace and Disarmament and the Afghan League of Human Rights. In addition, the mission met with Commander Haqqani's Deputy and representatives of Hezb-i-Wahdat. Meetings were also held with tribal leaders, representatives of Afghan women's

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associations, a group of Afghan personalities and the Council for Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan. On 26 April, it met representatives of the Ahmadzai tribe. Owing to their absence from Peshawar, the mission was not able to meet the leader of the Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, and the leader of the Harakat-i-Islami, Mr. Mohammad Asef Mohseni.

9. On 28 April, the special mission travelled to Khost and met there with the Governor and Shura, as well as many other leaders, who explained their views at an outdoor assembly of hundreds of people.

10. While at Islamabad, the mission met with Afghan Ambassador Roshan and Foreign Minister Arsala. It also met with Ambassador Bakr, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several ambassadors accredited to Pakistan.

11. At Rome, the Mission met with the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, and at Geneva with several former leaders, including Mr. Samad Hamed, former Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan. At Bonn, the mission met a gathering, chaired by Mr. Mohammad Yusef, former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and attended by some 40 Afghan personalities and former leaders presently residing in Europe and the United States of America.

12. The special mission also met with representatives of regional and other countries, which have a special interest in the situation in Afghanistan and may be in a position to assist in the peace process. In this connection, it travelled to the capitals of a number of countries, where it held discussions with, among others, Ms. Robin Raphel, the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia of the United States, President Farouk Leghari and Foreign Minister Sardar Asef Ali of Pakistan, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Saoud al Faysal, Foreign Minister Velayati, Interior Minister Besharati and Deputy Foreign Minister Boroujerdi of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Ivanov, as well as Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin and Mr. Ozdem Sanberk, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey.

13. Consultations were also held at Jeddah with the Representative for Afghanistan of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Regrettably, the mission was unable to visit Uzbekistan owing to a scheduling problem. It intends to do so and meet with President Karimov in the near future.
